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II. ARGUMENT IN REPLY
The state alleged that when Appellant Roy Roberts fired three shots, he intended to
violently injure his neighbor, Ray Lusk, as Mr. Lusk mowed his lawn. According to Mr. Lusk's
trial testimony, he dismounted his lawnmower after feeling a bullet whiz past his head and faced
Mr. Roberts. Mr. Lusk then claimed that Mr. Roberts pointed his gun at Mr. Lusk long enough
for Mr. Lusk to believe Mr. Roberts would shoot.
The district court proposed instruction allowed the jury to find Mr. Roberts guilty of
aggravated assault if it concluded that he: (1) fired the weapon intending to injure Mr. Lusk and/
or (2) pointed the firearm in Mr. Lusk's direction after the shots were fired, causing him to feel
threatened. Mr. Roberts objected because the charging document alleged that he attempted to
commit a violent injury with a firearm. Mr. Roberts asked the district court to follow the
applicable Idaho Criminal Jury Instruction ("ICJI"), which provides for a "description of [the]
conduct alleged in the charging document" in the elements instruction. ICJI 1205. The district
court overruled Mr. Roberts' objection, thereby creating a fatal variance between the charging
document and the jury instructions.
In response, that state ignores the allegation that Mr. Roberts pointed the firearm after
firing the shots and claims the Information notified Mr. Roberts that he was charged with
pointing the firearm because he necessarily pointed the gun before firing. The state further claims
that Mr. Roberts did not preserve his appellate argument and asked the district court to instruct
the jury on both the attempted-violence and threat-based versions of assault. The state's
arguments have no merit and this Court should vacate and remand.
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A.

Mr. Lusk's Trial Testimony Described Two Acts: (1) Firing the Weapon With Intent
To Injure Followed by (2) Pointing the Firearm in a Threatening Manner
According to the state, the district court properly instructed the jury it could find Mr.

Roberts guilty for pointing the firearm at Mr. Lusk because Mr. Roberts must have pointed the
gun before firing it. Respondent's Brief, p. 6. That Mr. Roberts necessarily pointed the firearm

before firing is irrelevant to whether the district court properly instructed the jury to find Mr.
Roberts guilty if it concluded he also pointed the firearm at Mr. Lusk after the shots were fired.
According to Mr. Lusk's trial testimony, he was mowing his lawn when he heard
gunshots and felt something "whiz past" his head. Tr. p. 193, In. 1-12. Mr. Lusk dismounted,
turned toward Mr. Roberts' property and claimed he saw Mr. Roberts leaning over a fence with
his gun aimed toward Mr. Lusk. Id. at. p. 193, In. 10-15; p. 194, In. 7-22. Mr. Lusk testified that
he directed his gaze toward his lawnmower and when he looked up ten to fifteen seconds later,
he observed Mr. Roberts continuing to point the gun at him. Id. at. p. 193, In. 15-18; p. 194, In.
2-19. Mr. Lusk testified that Mr. Roberts could have shot at him when pointing the gun in his
direction and also believed Mr. Roberts had intended to hit him when he fired the shots. Id. at. p.
253, In. 10-20.
Subsection (a) and (b) ofl.C. § 18-901 are distinct crimes requiring a distinct mens rea.

State v. Larson, 158 Idaho 130, 137, 344 P.3d 910, 917 (Ct. App. 2014). Mr. Lusk's testimony
that Mr. Roberts fired his gun intending the bullets to strike him describes an unlawful attempt to
violently injure Mr. Lusk under LC. § 18-901(a). Conversely, Mr. Lusk's testimony that Mr.
Roberts pointed the firearm after firing the gun describes a threat to violently injure Mr. Lusk
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that created a well-founded fear that the violence was imminent under LC. § 18-901 (b ). If Mr.
Roberts intended to shoot Mr. Lusk as he mowed the lawn, Mr. Roberts did not also intend to
threaten Mr. Lusk because Mr. Lusk did not see Mr. Roberts before the shots were fired. And Mr.
Roberts could have later pointed a firearm at Mr. Lusk in an intimidating way, thereby creating a
well-founded fear of imminent violence, without intending to shoot. See Larson, 15 8 Idaho at
137, 344 P.3d at 917.
The elements instruction allowed the jury to find Mr. Roberts guilty of: (1) firing the
weapon intending to injure Mr. Lusk or (2) pointing the firearm when Mr. Lusk turned to face
him, thereby creating a fear of imminent violence. The state charged Mr. Lusk with the former,
not the latter.

B.

Mr. Roberts Requested an Elements Instruction That Would Have Only Allowed the
Jury to Convict Him of Aggravated Assault if it Believed He Intended to Injure Mr.
Lusk When Firing The Gun
According to the state, Mr. Roberts "specifically requested that the jury be instructed on

both statutory definitions of assault" and, thus, cannot claim the district court erred in allowing
the jury to convict him for committing an assault under LC. § 18-901 (b) when he was charged
under LC. § 18-901(a). Respondent's Brief, p. 7. The state supports this assertion by noting that
Mr. Roberts' requested jury instructions included ICJI 1201, which defines an assault as an
unlawful attempt to violently injure another or as a threat to do violence to the person of the
other that includes some act which creates a well-founded fear in the other person that such
violence is imminent.
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The state ignores that Mr. Roberts' proposed elements' instruction provided:
1. On or about September 1, 201 7
2. in the State of Idaho
3. the defendant Roy W. Roberts committed an assault upon Ray L. Lusk,
4. by attempting to commit a violent injury upon the person of Ray L. Lusk, and
5. the defendant committed that assault with a deadly weapon.
R. 151, 289 (emphasis added). This requested instruction plainly instructs the jury to find Mr.
Roberts guilty if it found he violated I. C. § 18- 901 (a). The general instruction defining assault
under subsection (a) and (b) can not be construed as a request to instruct the jury on both
statutory definitions when Mr. Roberts requested an elements instruction, which instructed the
jury to convict only if it concluded Mr. Roberts committed an assault under LC. § 18- 901(a).
Indeed, Mr. Roberts explained that he objected to "number four" of the elements
instruction, which read "by firing and/or pointing a firearm at or in the general direction of Ray
L. Lusk." Tr. p. 580, In. 1-2. Mr. Roberts asked the district court to utilize his requested elements

instruction, which was consistent with ICJI 1205 by inserting the conduct alleged in the charging
document into number 4. Tr. p. 580, In. 7-12.
Mr. Roberts's requested instruction on the elements of aggravated assault would have
limited the jury to finding him guilty only if it concluded he intended to injure Mr. Roberts. By
including the pattern instruction defining assault, Mr. Roberts did not invite the district court to
ignore his objection to the elements instruction and instruct the jury to find him guilty of either
an attempt-based or threat-based assault.
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C.

Mr. Roberts Objected to the Jury Instruction Because It Varied From the Charging
Document

Mr. Roberts objected to the district court's instruction because he had been charged with
assault by attempting to commit violent injury and the court's instruction added language not
included in the charging document. Tr. p. 80, In. 7-13. Mr. Roberts asked the district court to
instruct the jury consistent with ICJI by utilizing the allegation in the Information.
Despite Mr. Roberts' specific objection, the state claims: "At no point did Roberts
contend or argue that the basis for his objection to the proposed elements instruction was that the
information cited to LC.§ 18- 901(a) but did not cite to LC.§ 18-901(b)." Respondent's Brief, p.
7. Thus, according to the state, Mr. Roberts did raise his argument in the district court.
However, counsel did not need to cite LC.§ 18- 901(a) and (b) to preserve his argument
that the jury instruction varied from the charging document. Indeed, it is "proper and necessary"
for "the specific legal arguments" a party uses to support its position to evolve on appeal as the
parties "ruminate on issues and case law ... [that] may need to be applied to the specific facts of
the case." State v. Gonzalez, 165 Idaho 95, 98, 439 P.3d 1267, 1270 (2019). However, such
pragmatic evolutions do not extend to new substantive issues or a new position on an issue that
the trial court had no opportunity to rule on. Id. In other words, a "groomed horse is expected on
appeal, but a different horse is forbidden." Id. at 99, 439 P.3d at 1271.
Mr. Roberts' requested that the jury instruction track the charging document, which cited
LC. § 18-901(a), and alleged he committed an assault by an attempted injury. Mr. Roberts
objected to the district court's inclusion of the phrase "firing and/or pointing" because that
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conduct not alleged in the Information. This argument is the essence of the argument presented
on appeal.
Further, the record in this case illustrates why the jury trial horse does not exhibit the
appellate horse's polish. After Mr. Roberts explained he objected to the elements instruction, the
district court indicated: "I believe this is my own language here. I put in firing and/or pointing. I
believe either or, or both of those, would justify a verdict of guilty in this matter. I included the
by firing or pointing language." Tr. p. 580, In. 1-6. Mr. Roberts argued that the ICJI includes a
bracket for '"Description of conduct alleged in the charging document." Tr. p. 580, In. 7-9. Mr.
Roberts argued that the charging document alleged an "attempt to commit a violent injury upon
the person of Ray Lusk. So that's the language that I would be requesting, because that's what the
[information] says." Tr. p. 580, In. 7-12.
The district court recognized that the "charging language in the criminal information" did
not include its proposed language and "that there was some pleading issues with respect to that
criminal information" but that the information to encompassed "firing and/or pointing." Tr. p.
580, In. 17-25. The district court indicated Mr. Roberts "is arguing ... did the information give
them notice of the acts that Mr. Roberts was being charged with that would amount to be
aggravated assault." Tr. p. 581, In. 4-8. Mr. Roberts proffered ICJI 1205, 1 which cites case law

The transcript reflects that defense counsel asked to provide the district court with an
unidentified document, which "on the bottom" indicated the complaint should control. Tr. p. 81,
In. 24-25. The "bottom" ofICJI 1205 cites to State v. Sherrod, 131 Idaho 56,951 P.2d 1283 (Ct.
App. 1998) for the proposition that "the jury instruction should include, in general terms, the
description of the conduct alleged in the charging document to constitute the crime charged" in
order to protect against a fatal variance.
1
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indicating that the "complaint should control." Tr. p. 581, In. 22-24. The district court indicated
the section addressed notice of the charged facts and circumstances and inquired whether Mr.
Roberts argued the Information did not give fair notice. Tr. p. 582, In. 1-3.
Counsel began to argue "Well, Your Honor, as I read the criminal information ..... " Tr. p.
582, In. 4-5. But the district court interjected, ruling that the Information could have been more
artfully drafted to include the elements as well as the supporting facts supporting but that
"everyone understood quite clearly that the [charged] conduct was shooting or aiming a firearm."
Tr. p. 582, In. 6-20. Defense counsel advised that he respected "the decision of the court" and
affirmed that he objected to the court's inclusion of the phrase "by firing and/or pointing a
firearm" because "that language was not contained within the charging document." Tr. p. 582, In.
1-12.
When the district court stopped defense counsel's argument, he could have been on the
verge of explaining "as I read the criminal information, it only charges assault by attempted
violence under LC. § 18- 901(a) and the court's instruction would allow the jury to find Mr.
Roberts guilty of pointing the firearm at him in a threatening way LC.§ 18- 901(b)." That
counsel was not given the opportunity to finish his argument illustrates the district court's time
management as the jury waited to receive instructions, hear closing argument and begin
deliberating.
Legal arguments in the midst of trial are necessarily brief and courts frequently decline
further argument when ready to rule. In such circumstances, the defense attorney who the judge
silenced mid-argument cannot also be accused of strategically sandbagging the court, the
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apparent concern underlying the fundamental error doctrine's erosion. See Gonzalez, 165 Idaho
at 98-99, 439 P.3d at 1270-71, citing State v. Garcia-Rodriguez, 162 Idaho 271,276,396 P.3d
700, 705 (2017) (requiring parties to raise issues below is for the "protection of inferior courts"
because "it is manifestly unfair for a party to go into court and slumber... take no exception to
the ruling, present no point for the attention of the court, and seek to present his defense [for the
first time] to the judgment of the appellate court").
Here, the district court was undoubtedly aware that the Information alleged that Mr.
Roberts violated LC. § 18- 901(a) despite the fact counsel did not cite the code in his argument.
Additionally, the court's discussion of "notice" reflects that the district court recognized that Mr.
Roberts objected because the instruction varied from the charging document.
Mr. Roberts objected to the elements instruction because it varied from the charging
document. The essence of Mr. Roberts' appellate argument is the same, having been developed
with citation to statute and case law. The state's argument that the fatal variance is not properly
before this Court is without merit.

III. CONCLUSION
The elements instruction varied from the information by allowing the jury to find Mr.
Roberts guilty of an assault under LC. § 18-901 (b ), when the state specifically accused him of
assault by attempting to injure Mr. Lusk under LC. § 18-901(a). Mr. Roberts objected to the
instruction because it included language other than what was alleged in the charging document.
The two methods of committing assault require distinct mens rea and the record reveals that Mr.
Roberts might have been misled in preparing his defense. Accordingly, for all the reasons set
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forth above and in Mr. Roberts' opening brief, the aggravated assault conviction violates Mr.
Roberts right to due process and this Court must vacate his conviction.
Respectfully submitted this 22nd day of October 2019.

FYFFE LAW, LLC

Isl Robyn Fyffe
ROBYN FYFFE
Attorney for Roy Roberts
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